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We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, summarized in a 
liability matrix. Agents' assets might be insufficient to satisfy their liabilities leading to 
defaults. We assume the primitives to be denoted in some unit of account. In case of default, 
bankruptcy rules are used to specify the way agents are going to be rationed. We present a 
convenient representation of bankruptcy rules. A clearing payment matrix is a payment 
matrix consistent with the prevailing bankruptcy rules that satisfies limited liability and 
priority of creditors. Both clearing payment matrices and the corresponding values of equity 
are not uniquely determined. We provide bounds on the possible levels equity can take. We 
analyze decentralized clearing processes and show the convergence of any such process in 
finitely many steps to the least clearing payment matrix. When the unit of account is 
sufficiently small, all decentralized clearing processes lead essentially to the same value of 
equity as a centralized clearing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not necessary to 
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Decentralizált klíring pénzügyi hálózatokban 
 
Csóka Péter - P. Jean-Jacques Herings 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tekintsünk egy olyan helyzetet, amelyben a szereplőknek kölcsönös követeléseik vannak 
egymással szemben!  Ha egy szereplő eszköze nem elegendő tartozásainak kifizetésére, akkor 
a szereplő csődjéről beszélünk.  Feltesszük, hogy mindent valamilyen elszámolási egységben 
mérünk.  Csőd esetén csődszabályok mondják meg, hogy hogyan osztják el az eszközeiket a 
szereplők azok között, akiknek tartoznak. Megmutatjuk, hogy hogyan lehet a csődszabályokat 
jól reprezentálni. 
Egy fizetési mátrix klíringmátrix, ha teljesíti a korlátolt felelősséget és a hitelezők elsőbbségét, 
és összhangban van a szereplők csődszabályaival. A klíringmátrixok és az azokból eredő végső 
saját tőkék nem egyértelműek. Megadjuk, hogy a saját tőke milyen határok között mozoghat.  
A cikk fő hozzájárulásaként decentralizált klíringelő folyamatokat elemzünk és megmutatjuk, 
hogy mindegyik véges lépésben konvergál a legkisebb klíringmátrixhoz. Ha az elszámolási 
egység kellően kicsi, akkor mindegyik decentralizált klíringelő folyamat lényegében 
ugyanahhoz a saját tőkéhez vezet, mintha központilag klíringelnénk. Cikkünk 
gazdaságpolitikai következménye az, hogy nem szükséges egyszerre összegyűjteni és 
feldolgozni a szereplők érzékeny adatai és központilag klíringelni. 
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We consider a situation in which agents have mutual claims on each other, sum-
marized in a liability matrix. Agents’ assets might be insufficient to satisfy their
liabilities leading to defaults. We assume the primitives to be denoted in some unit
of account. In case of default, bankruptcy rules are used to specify the way agents are
going to be rationed. We present a convenient representation of bankruptcy rules.
A clearing payment matrix is a payment matrix consistent with the prevailing
bankruptcy rules that satisfies limited liability and priority of creditors. Both clear-
ing payment matrices and the corresponding values of equity are not uniquely de-
termined. We provide bounds on the possible levels equity can take. We analyze
decentralized clearing processes and show the convergence of any such process in
finitely many steps to the least clearing payment matrix. When the unit of account
is sufficiently small, all decentralized clearing processes lead essentially to the same
value of equity as a centralized clearing procedure. As a policy implication, it is not
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1 Introduction
The treatment of bankruptcy of countries, banks, firms, organizations, and individuals will
always be a challenge for society. In the original bankruptcy problem, starting with the
seminal paper of O’Neill (1982), there is a single bankrupt agent and the other agents only
have claims on the estate of this agent. In this paper, we analyze networks of agents, where
agents have mutual claims on each other. An agent is characterized by his endowments and
his liabilities towards the other agents. The assets of an agent consist of his endowments
together with the liabilities of other agents towards him. If the assets of an agent are not
sufficient to satisfy his own liabilities, then the agent has to default. In a network setting,
a default can also result from contagion, where an agent defaults only because other agents
are not fully paying their liabilities to him. The default of a single agent can therefore
result in domino effect that potentially leads to an all encompassing cascade of defaults.
We are interested in the final resulting outcome in terms of payments and equity and how
this outcome is influenced by the use of centralized procedures versus decentralized clearing
processes.
An important application concerns financial networks, where Eisenberg and Noe (2001)
is the seminal paper. Recent crisis on financial markets triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy
as well as sovereign debt problems of European countries provide prime examples of why
the network perspective is important. Part of the literature on financial networks concerns
the appropriate measurement of systemic risk, see Chen et al. (2013) for an axiomatic
approach as well as Demange (2015). There is also a substantial literature that relates the
number and magnitude of defaults to the network topology and that characterizes those
structures that tend to propagate default, see Gai and Kapadia (2010), Elliott et al. (2014),
Acemoglu et al. (2015), Capponi et al. (2015), and Glasserman and Young (2015). The
basic setup of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) has also been extended in various directions, for
instance in Cifuentes et al. (2005) and Shin (2008) by allowing for liquidity considerations
or in Rogers and Veraart (2013) by allowing for costs of default.
Network effects of defaults occur also outside financial settings. Brown (1979) presents
an application of a supply chain network consisting of coal mines and power companies,
where due to a strike only the non-union mines produce and the other mines default on
their deliveries of coal. Another example is related to international student exchange
problems, as well as the closely related problem of tuition exchange studied in Dur and
U¨nver (2015), where the agents correspond to colleges. The endowments of a college equal
the maximum net inflow of students it can handle, its liabilities correspond to commitments
made to receive incoming students, and claims are the agreements with other colleges to
send outgoing students. As another example, the agents can be servers that process jobs
for a set of users. The endowments of a server correspond to its capacity for processing
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jobs, its liabilities to jobs that it has to process for other servers, and its claims to jobs
that are outsourced to other servers. An example similar to the one with servers concerns
time banks, where the agents are workers instead of servers.
In reality, endowments and claims are denoted in some smallest unit of account (dollars,
number of students, number of jobs, etc.). We therefore analyze the discrete setup, where
endowments and liabilities are expressed as non-negative integers. The discrete setup
has also been analyzed in the bankruptcy literature with multiple claimants on a single
estate, see Moulin (2000), Moulin and Stong (2002), Herrero and Mart´ınez (2008), and
Chen (2015), but so far not in a network setting. Given the prominence of the financial
applications, we use the terminology of that framework, but want to emphasize that our
model is relevant outside that specific setup.
If an agent is bankrupt, then a division rule specifies how the liabilities of various
creditors are going to be settled. Following the seminal paper by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), the literature on systemic risk in financial networks has adopted proportional rules
specifying payment ratios less than one in case of default. In reality, not all the liabilities
are of the same seniority and some of the liabilities are more senior than others. American
bankruptcy law, for instance, is a mixed lexicographic-proportional system, see Kaminski
(2000). We therefore allow for general bankruptcy rules. We relate division rules as used
in the divisible setup to bankruptcy rules as used in our discrete framework and present a
convenient representation for bankruptcy rules.
A payment matrix describes how much agents actually pay to each other. We introduce
the notions of feasibility, limited liability, and priority of creditors and define the notion of
a clearing payment matrix. Feasibility of a payment matrix means that payments are made
in accordance with bankruptcy rules. Limited liability means the payment matrix should
result in non-negative equity levels for all agents. Priority of creditors requires that if an
agent is not paying all of its liabilities, then a higher payment should lead to a negative
equity level. Contrary to the divisible case, where Eisenberg and Noe (2001) formulate the
property of absolute priority, our notion of priority of creditors sometimes allows an agent
to have positive equity even if some outstanding liabilities remain.
We characterize all clearing payment matrices as a fixed point of an appropriately
defined function. We show that there exist a least and a greatest clearing payment ma-
trix. Unlike the divisible case, different clearing payment matrices may result in different
amounts of equity. We give a formula for the minimal and maximal difference between the
value of equity for a given agent in any two clearing payment matrices.
The literature on financial networks has presented a number of algorithms to compute
a clearing payment matrix with a typical emphasis on the computation of the greatest
clearing payment matrix. Examples of such algorithms are presented in Eisenberg and Noe
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(2001), Rogers and Veraart (2013), and Elliott et al. (2014). These algorithms correspond
to centralized procedures for finding a clearing payment matrix. The required levels of
payments during the execution of the algorithm are typically not implementable and are
computed by solving a joint optimization program or a simultaneous system of equations.
As noted in Elsinger et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010), the complexity of
the financial system means that policymakers have only partial information about the true
linkages between financial intermediaries. It is therefore not realistic to assume that a single
decision maker has all the information that is needed in the execution of the algorithms.
On top of that, it is not realistic to assume that all assets of defaulting agents can be
liquidated instantaneously. We therefore look at decentralized processes to arrive at a
clearing payment matrix.
By decentralized we mean a process where agents are making payments one by one
rather than simultaneous, where only local information is needed to determine the amounts
to be paid, and where the payments made are implementable at each iteration of the
process. We show that any decentralized process in a large class converges in finitely many
iterations to the least clearing payment matrix. In this sense, the cost of decentralization
is therefore to go from the greatest to the least clearing payment matrix. The bounds we
derive on the final levels of equity show that this cost is typically small in financial markets.
Thus as a policy implication for financial markets, instead of working on collecting and
processing data centrally, we suggest that it is sufficient to have local liquidators enforcing
bankruptcy rules.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents division rules and bankruptcy
rules, used in the divisible and the discrete setup respectively, for problems with a single
estate and multiple claimants. Section 3 extends bankruptcy rules to the network setup and
presents some examples. In Section 4 we analyze clearing payment matrices as fixed points
and derive the bounds for the difference between the values of equity for a given agent in
any two clearing payment matrices. Section 5 shows how any decentralized clearing process
in a large class converges to the least clearing payment matrix. Section 6 deals with the
convergence to the divisible case. Section 7 concludes.
2 Bankruptcy Rules
A bankruptcy problem is a pair (c, E) ∈ RI+×R+, where R+ is the set of non-negative real
numbers. In a bankruptcy problem, the amount of the estate E has to be divided among
the agents in the set I with cardinality n. Agent i ∈ I has a claim on the estate equal to
ci. In the bankruptcy literature, it is typically assumed that
∑
i∈I ci ≥ E and a division
rule is defined as a function that associates with each such (c, E) a vector y ∈ RI+ such
3
that
∑
i∈I yi = E and yi ≤ ci for every i ∈ I. For surveys of the literature on bankruptcy
problems, we refer the reader to Thomson (2003), Thomson (2013), and Thomson (2015).1
Since we will also encounter situations where the value of the estate surpasses the sum of
the claims, we define a division rule as follows.
Definition 2.1. Given a vector of claims c ∈ RI+ \ {0I}, a division rule is a monotonic
function d : R+ → RI+ such that, for every E ∈ R+,
∑
i∈I di(E) = min{
∑
i∈I ci, E} and,
for every i ∈ I, di(E) ≤ ci.
Definition 2.1 requires division rules to be monotonic: for every E,E ′ ∈ R+ such that
E ≤ E ′, it holds for every i ∈ I that di(E) ≤ di(E ′) or, equivalently, d(E) ≤ d(E ′). A
weakly higher value of the estate leads to weakly higher payments to everybody. This
property is called resource monotonicity in the bankruptcy literature, see Thomson (2003),
or endowment monotonicity, see Thomson (2015). It can be shown that the conditions of
Definition 2.1 imply that division rules are continuous.
An important class of division rules are the priority division rules.
Definition 2.2. Given a vector of claims c ∈ RI+ and a permutation pi : I → {1, . . . , n},
the priority division rule dpi : R+ → RI+ is defined by
dpij (E) = max{0,min{cj, E −
∑
i∈pi−1({1,...,pi(j)−1})
ci}}, j ∈ I, E ∈ R+.
Under the division rule dpi, the estate has a priority list of creditors as determined by
the permutation pi. The claims of agents pi−1(1), pi−1(2), . . . are paid for sequentially as
long as the estate permits this.
Another frequently used division rule is the proportional division rule.
Definition 2.3. Given a vector of claims c ∈ RI+, the proportional division rule dprop :
R+ → RI+ is defined by
dpropj (E) = min{cj,
cj∑
i∈I ci
E}, j ∈ I, E ∈ R+.
1There is also an emerging literature on the extension of the bankruptcy literature to network settings.
The emphasis in these papers is on the axiomatic foundation of allocation rules. Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten
(2009) analyze generalized bankruptcy problems with multiples estates as flow sharing problems and define
the nucleolus and the constrained egalitarian solution for such problems. Moulin and Sethuraman (2013)
consider bipartite rationing problems, where agents can have claims on a subset of unrelated estates.
They consider whether rules for single resource problems can be consistently extended to their framework.
Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013) axiomatize the Aumann-Maschler bankruptcy rule in financial networks
with general division rules.
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Under the proportional division rule, the estate is divided in proportion to the claims.
If the estate exceeds the sum of the claims, then every claimant receives his claim.
It is standard in both the bankruptcy and the systemic risk literature to assume that the
estate is arbitrarily divisible. Estates and claims are real numbers and so is the amount paid
as determined by a division rule. In reality, estates and claims are denoted in some smallest
unit of account and are therefore non-negative integers. For papers in the bankruptcy
literature, the discrete setup has also been studied in Young (1994), Moulin (2000), Moulin
and Stong (2002), Herrero and Mart´ınez (2008), and Chen (2015). The emphasis in these
papers is on the axiomatic foundation of allocation rules. All papers in the systemic risk
literature stick to the divisible approach.
When taking the integer requirement into account, we will refer to bankruptcy rules
rather than division rules. It is evident how to define the priority bankruptcy rule, since
priority division rules applied to integer-valued estates and claims lead to integer valued
payments. However, it is easy to see that the proportional division rule is not necessarily
leading to integers, even if the estate and the claims are. It is for this reason that Moulin
(2000) describes the priority rules as the most natural rationing methods in the discrete
model. Our desire to allow for a discrete version of for instance the proportional division
rule motivates the following definition of a bankruptcy rule. Let N0 denote the natural
numbers including 0.
Definition 2.4. Given a vector of claims c ∈ NI0, a bankruptcy rule is a monotonic function
b : N0 → NI0 such that, for every E ∈ N0,
∑
i∈I bi(E) ≤ min{
∑
i∈I ci, E} with equality when∑
i∈I ci ≤ E and, for every i ∈ I, bi(E) ≤ ci. Moreover, for every E,E ′ ∈ N0 such that
E ≤ E ′, ∑i∈I bi(E ′) ≤ E implies b(E) = b(E ′).
We illustrate the definition of bankruptcy rules in Example 2.8. Contrary to division
rules, the assumptions made on bankruptcy rules allow for the possibility that
∑
i∈I bi(E) <
E if E <
∑
i∈I ci. Some of the estate may not be distributed among the agents in case the
estate falls below the total value of the liabilities. However, the requirement that for every
E,E ′ ∈ N0 such that E ≤ E ′,
∑
i∈I bi(E
′) ≤ E implies b(E ′) = b(E) puts limits on the
extent to which paying less than the estate is possible. The bankruptcy literature that has
been dealing with the discrete setup has insisted on the requirement that
∑
i∈I bi(E) = E,
thereby ruling out a discrete version of the proportional rule. We therefore allow for a
larger class of bankruptcy rules. We now elaborate on this issue and in doing so, we also
present a convenient representation for bankruptcy rules.
The image F (b) of a bankruptcy rule b determines the feasible set of payments. More
formally, we have
F (b) = b(N0) = ∪{E∈N0|E≤∑i∈I ci}{b(E)}.
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The feasible set of payments F (b) can be found by considering the value of the bankruptcy
rule for integer values of the estate between zero and the total amount of claims.
The requirement that for every E,E ′ ∈ N0 such that E ≤ E ′,
∑
i∈I bi(E
′) ≤ E im-
plies b(E) = b(E ′) corresponds to the requirement that bankruptcy rules impose maximal
feasible payments. Indeed, b(E) is the maximal vector in F (b) for which the sum of the
components is less than or equal to E. Notice that the monotonicity of b implies that ≤
is a total order on the set F (b), i.e. the order ≤ on F (b) is antisymmetric, transitive, and
complete. A maximal vector in F (b) is therefore uniquely determined.
Vice versa, any bounded set F ⊂ NI0, which is totally ordered by ≤ and contains 0I ,
pins down an induced bankruptcy rule bF . For E ∈ N0, let
bF (E) = max{f ∈ F |
∑
i∈I
fi ≤ E},
where the maximum is unique since F is a finite set, F contains 0I , and ≤ is a total order
on F. The following proposition states that bF is indeed a bankruptcy rule, where the
vector of claims is given by c = maxF.
Proposition 2.5. Let F be a bounded subset of NI0, which is totally ordered by ≤ and
contains 0I . Then bF is a bankruptcy rule, given the vector of claims c = maxF.
Proof. Clearly, it holds that bF is a monotonic function from N0 into NI0.
If
∑
i∈I ci ≤ E, then
bF (E) = max{f ∈ F |
∑
i∈I
fi ≤ E} = maxF = c,
where the second equality follows since c = maxF and
∑
i∈I ci ≤ E. In this case, we
therefore have that∑
i∈I
bFi (E) = min{
∑
i∈I
ci, E}.
If
∑
i∈I ci > E, then∑
i∈I
bFi (E) ≤ E = min{
∑
i∈I
ci, E},
where the inequality follows immediately from the definition of bF (E).
Since F is totally ordered by ≤, we have, for every f ∈ F, f ≤ maxF = c. It now
follows that, for every E ∈ N0, for every i ∈ I, bFi (E) ≤ ci.
Let E,E ′ ∈ N0 be such that E ≤ E ′ and
∑
i∈I b
F
i (E
′) ≤ E. Since bF (E ′) = max{f ∈
F |∑i∈I fi ≤ E ′} and ∑i∈I bFi (E ′) ≤ E, it follows that
bF (E) = max{f ∈ F |
∑
i∈I
fi ≤ E} = bF (E ′).
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2Each division rule induces a bankruptcy rule in the following way. Given a set X ⊂ RI+,
we define
bXc = {f ∈ NI0 | ∃x ∈ X such that f = bxc},
where bxc denotes the vector obtained by taking for every i ∈ I the floor of xi, the largest
integer which is less than or equal to xi.
Definition 2.6. The division rule d : R+ → RI+ leads to the induced bankruptcy rule
bbd(R+)c : N0 → NI0.
The next result establishes that bbd(R+)c is a bankruptcy rule indeed.
Proposition 2.7. Given a vector of claims c ∈ RI+, let d : R+ → RI+ be a division
rule. The function bbd(R+)c : N0 → NI0 is a bankruptcy rule, given the vector of claims
bcc = maxbd(R+)c.
Proof. We show that bd(R+)c is a bounded subset of NI0 containing 0I that is totally
ordered by ≤ . The result then follows from Proposition 2.5.
Since, for every E ∈ R+, for every i ∈ I, di(E) ≤ ci, it follows that bd(R+)c is a
bounded subset of NI0. Monotonicity of d implies that bd(R+)c is totally ordered by ≤ .
Since d maps into RI+ and
∑
i∈I di(0) = min{
∑
i∈I ci, 0} = 0, it follows that d(0) = 0I , so
0I ∈ bd(R+)c. 2
We illustrate the definitions of bankruptcy rule and feasible set of payments in the
following example.
Example 2.8. We have three agents I = {1, 2, 3} with estate E = 1 and claims c = (0, 2, 2)
as presented in Table 1.
E c
1 0 2 2
Table 1: The estate and claims of the agents in Example 2.8.
First, let us consider priority bankruptcy rules, bankruptcy rules induced by priority
division rules. Suppose priorities are described by the identity, pi(1) = 1, pi(2) = 2, and
pi(3) = 3, so first payments to agent 1 should be made, a possible remainder of the estate
to agent 2, and if there is still part of the estate remaining, payments can be made to
agent 3. It is easily verified that the feasible set of payments is given by
F = bdpi(R+)c = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)}.
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It therefore holds that bF (1) = (0, 1, 0), so the entire estate goes to agent 2.
By Proposition 2.7, the priority bankruptcy rules satisfy all the assumptions we have
imposed on bankruptcy rules. A priority bankruptcy rule b also has the property that∑
i∈I bi(E) = min{E,
∑
i∈I ci} for every E ∈ N0, so the equality also holds in case
∑
i∈I ci >
E. Priority bankruptcy rules have nice axiomatic foundations. As has been demonstrated
in Moulin (2000) these are the only rules satisfying consistency, upper composition, and
lower composition.
Second, let us consider the proportional bankruptcy rule, the bankruptcy rule induced
by the proportional division rule. In this case
F = bdprop(R+)c = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 2)}.
It follows that bF (1) = (0, 0, 0), so no payments are made to any agent in this case.
Again by Proposition 2.7, the proportional bankruptcy rules satisfies all the assumptions
we have imposed on bankruptcy rules. A proportional bankruptcy rule b does not have the
property that
∑
i∈I bi(E) = min{E,
∑
i∈I ci} for all values of E as follows clearly from the
example.
As a final example, consider the all or nothing bankruptcy rule, in which either all or
none of the claims are being paid. An example of such a rule can be found in Acemoglu
et al. (2015) who study banking networks and assume that banks are forced to liquidate
their projects in full, e.g. because it is difficult to liquidate a fraction of an ongoing real
project. Other examples would arise in applications with supply chain networks, where
either a full or no delivery takes place.
In Example 2.8, the feasible set of payments corresponding to the all or nothing
bankruptcy rule is given by
F = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 2)}.
The all or nothing bankruptcy rule is an example of a bankruptcy rule that is not induced
by any division rule. Indeed, let d be a division rule, given claims c = (0, 2, 2). Since d is
continuous, the set bd(R+)c contains an element f such that f2 = 1, as well as an element
f ′ such that f ′3 = 1.
The all or nothing bankruptcy rule satisfies all the assumptions we have imposed on
bankruptcy rules by Proposition 2.5.
3 Clearing Payment Matrices
In the bankruptcy literature, there is typically a single bankrupt agent and the estate is
an exogenously given amount. In the systemic risk literature, there are multiple defaulting
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agents and the estates are determined endogenously. In this section, we extend bankruptcy
rules to financial networks and define clearing payment matrices.
The primitives of a financial network are given by the tuple (z, L, b).
The vector z ∈ NI0 represents the endowments of the agents in the set I. The endowment
of an agent includes all his tangible and intangible assets, but excludes the claims and
liabilities such an agent has towards the other agents.
The n×n liability matrix L ∈ NI×I0 describes the mutual claims of the agents. Its entry
Lij is the liability of agent i towards agent j. We make the normalizing assumption that
Lii = 0 for all i ∈ I. In general, it can occur that agent i has a liability towards agent j
and vice versa, so both Lij > 0 and Lji > 0.
The payments to be made by agent i ∈ I to the other agents are determined by the
bankruptcy rule bi : N0 → NI0. The vector of claims on the estate of agent i is given by Li,
that is, row i of the liability matrix L. Given a value Ei ∈ N0 of the estate of agent i ∈ I,
the monetary amount bij(Ei) ∈ N0 specifies how much agent i has to pay to agent j ∈ I.
The requirement of a bankruptcy rule in Definition 2.4 that bij(Ei) ≤ Lij for every j ∈ I
now implies that the function bii is identically equal to 0. The feasible set of payments
F (bi) corresponding to bankruptcy rule bi is denoted by Fi.
Contrary to the bankruptcy literature, the value of the estate of agent i is endogenous
in a financial network, since it depends not only on the initial endowments of agent i ∈ I,
but also on the claims i has on other agents, part of which may not be received by agent i.
The tuple (bi)i∈I of bankruptcy rules is denoted by b.
An n × n payment matrix P ∈ NI×I0 collects the mutual payments of the agents, that
is, Pij is the amount paid by agent i to agent j. We make the normalizing assumption
that Pii = 0 for all i ∈ I. The set of all payment matrices with this property is denoted by
M. The partial order ≤ on M is defined in the usual way: For P, P ′ ∈ M, it holds that
P ≤ P ′ if and only if Pij ≤ P ′ij for all (i, j) ∈ I × I.
Given a financial network (z, L, b), a payment matrix P ∈ M is feasible if for every
i ∈ I it holds that Pi ∈ Fi. A payment matrix is feasible if every row i of the matrix belongs
to the feasible set of payments of agent i, that is payments are made in accordance with
bankruptcy rules. The set of all feasible payment matrices is denoted by P , so
P = {P ∈M | ∀i ∈ I, Pi ∈ Fi}.
The sum of the initial endowments of an agent and the payments received from the other
agents determines an agent’s asset value, more formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given a financial network (z, L, b) and a payment matrix P ∈ M, the
asset value ai(P ) of agent i ∈ I is given by
ai(P ) = zi +
∑
j∈I
Pji.
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The asset value of an agent will play the role of the estate.
Subtracting the payments as made by an agent from his asset value yields an agent’s
equity. More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3.2. Given a financial network (z, L, b) and a payment matrix P ∈ M, the
equity ei(P ) of agent i ∈ I is given by
ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij = zi +
∑
j∈I
(Pji − Pij) . (1)
If agent i ∈ I has negative equity even when all agents pay all their liabilities, so if
ei(L) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(Lji − Lij) < 0,
then agent i has so-called fundamental default. When an agent defaults only because other
agents are not fully paying their liabilities to him, then the agent is said to have contagion
default.
It holds that∑
i∈I
ei(P ) =
∑
i∈I
zi +
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
(Pji − Pij) =
∑
i∈I
zi. (2)
Payment matrices only lead to the redistribution of initial endowments.
Example 3.3. Consider a financial network (z, L, b) with three agents I = {1, 2, 3} and
endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 2. For every i ∈ I, the bankruptcy rule bi
equals the priority bankruptcy rule bpi where pi is the identity, so agent 1 has priority over
agent 2, who in turn has priority over agent 3.
z L
1 0 2 2
1 2 0 2
1 0 0 0
Table 2: The endowments and liabilities of the agents in Example 3.3.
The payment matrix P in Table 3 is feasible since each row i is selected from the
feasible set of payments Fi. Agent 1 has equity e1(P ) = 2, but still has unpaid liabilities
to both agents 2 and 3. Agent 2 has negative equity, e2(P ) = −2. The payment matrix P
suffers from two undesirable features. Agent 1 has a positive equity value and outstanding
liabilities. Agent 2 has a negative equity value.
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z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 0 3 2
1 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 -2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 3: An undesirable payment matrix in Example 3.3.
To overcome this situation, we extend the notions of priority of creditors and limited
liability defined in the divisible case for proportional division rules by Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) to our discrete setup with general bankruptcy rules.2
Definition 3.4. Given a financial network (z, L, b), P ∈ M is a clearing payment matrix
if it satisfies the following three properties.
1. Feasibility : P ∈ P .
2. Limited liability : For every i ∈ I, ei(P ) ≥ 0.
3. Priority of creditors : For every i ∈ I, for every P ′i ∈ Fi such that P ′i > Pi it holds
that ai(P )−
∑
j∈I P
′
ij < 0.
A clearing payment matrix is feasible, leads to non-negative equity values, and satisfies
priority of creditors. Notice that priority of creditors is satisfied whenever Pi = Li since
there is no P ′i ∈ Fi with P ′i > Pi in that case. In the divisible setup, priority of creditors
is defined as follows by Eisenberg and Noe (2001): For every i ∈ I, if Pi < Li, then
ei(P ) = 0. In the presence of integer payments, this condition is too strong. We therefore
use the requirement in Condition 3 of Definition 3.4 that agent i ends up with negative
equity if he chooses a feasible payment that is strictly higher, whereas all other agents
remain paying the same. Notice that the definition of ai(P ) only depends on how much
other agents pay to agent i and not on how much agent i pays to other agents.
The following proposition shows that in case the asset value of an agent is sufficient to
pay all his liabilities, then the agent will do so in a clearing payment matrix.
Proposition 3.5. Let P be a clearing payment matrix for the financial network (z, L, b).
For every i ∈ I, if ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij, then Pi = Li.
Proof. Suppose not. Let i ∈ I be such that ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij and Pi < Li. We define
P ′i = Li, which is an element of Fi indeed. It holds that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
P ′ij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij ≥ 0,
2Eisenberg and Noe (2001) refers to ‘priority of creditors’ as ‘priority of debt claims’ or ‘absolute
priority’ and to ‘limited liability’ as ‘limited liability (of equity)’.
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so P violates priority of creditors and is therefore not a clearing payment matrix, a con-
tradiction. 2
For the divisible setup with proportional division rules, Eisenberg and Noe (2001) show
that when all endowments are positive, then there is a unique clearing payment matrix.
Glasserman and Young (2015) present other conditions to get a unique clearing payment
matrix. Although in general multiple clearing payment matrices can co-exist, Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) show that the final equity is the same irrespective of the clearing matrix
that is being used. For the divisible setup with general division rules, uniqueness of final
equity values is shown in Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013).
The next example shows that in the case with indivisibilities, the clearing payment
matrix may not be unique even when all initial endowments are positive. More importantly,
the resulting values of equity might be different as well.
Example 3.6. As in Example 3.3, we consider a financial network (z, L, b) with three
agents I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 2, but replace
the priority bankruptcy rules of that example by proportional bankruptcy rules.
Table 4 presents the clearing payment matrix P and Table 5 the clearing payment
matrix P . There are no other clearing payment matrices. The matrices P and P induce
different equity values, e(P ) = (1, 1, 1) and e(P ) = (0, 0, 3).
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table 4: The clearing payment matrix P in Example 3.6.
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 5: The clearing payment matrix P in Example 3.6.
It holds that e1(P ) = e2(P ) = 1, so there is some equity left for both agents 1 and 2
when the payment matrix P is used. Nevertheless, Condition 3 of Definition 3.4, priority of
creditors, holds since there is no higher feasible payment compatible with the asset values
of agents 1 and 2.
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4 Clearing Payment Matrices as Fixed Points
In this section, we characterize a clearing payment matrix as a fixed point of an appropri-
ately defined function and derive the bounds for the difference between the values of equity
for a given agent in any two clearing payment matrices.
Given a financial network (z, L, b), let ϕ : P → P be defined by
ϕij(P ) = bij(ai(P )), P ∈ P , i, j ∈ I.
Proposition 4.1. Let a financial network (z, L, b) be given. The matrix P ∈ P is a
clearing payment matrix if and only if P = ϕ(P ).
Proof.
(⇒)
Consider some i ∈ I. We define P ′i = ϕi(P ). Since Pi ∈ Fi and bi is monotonic, it holds
that either (a) Pi < P
′
i , or (b) Pi = P
′
i , or (c) Pi > P
′
i .
Case (a). Pi < P
′
i .
We have that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
P ′ij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
ϕij(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
bij(ai(P )) ≥ 0.
This contradicts the fact that P satisfies priority of creditors. We conclude that Case (a)
cannot occur.
Case (c). Pi > P
′
i .
Since P satisfies limited liability, it holds that ei(P ) ≥ 0. Let Ei ∈ N0 be such that
Pi = bi(Ei). From bi(Ei) = Pi > P
′
i = bi(ai(P )), it follows that ai(P ) < Ei. Together with
the fact that∑
j∈I
bij(Ei) =
∑
j∈I
Pij = ai(P )− ei(P ) ≤ ai(P ),
this implies by Definition 2.4 that bi(ai(P )) = bi(Ei) and therefore that P
′
i = Pi, a contra-
diction to Pi > P
′
i . We conclude that Case (c) cannot occur.
It now follows that Case (b) holds, so Pi = P
′
i = ϕi(P ).
(⇐)
1. Feasibility. It holds that P ∈ P by the definition of ϕ.
2. Limited liability. For every i ∈ I, we have that
Pi = ϕi(P ) = bi(ai(P )),
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so
ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
bij(ai(P )) ≥ ai(P )− ai(P ) = 0.
3. Priority of creditors. Let i ∈ I and P ′i ∈ Fi be such that P ′i > Pi. Let E ′i ∈ N0 be
such that bi(E
′
i) = P
′
i . Since bi(ai(P )) = Pi < P
′
i = bi(E
′
i), monotonicity of bi implies that
E ′i > ai(P ).
Suppose, by contradiction, that ai(P )−
∑
j∈I P
′
ij ≥ 0. Then it holds that∑
j∈I
bij(E
′
i) =
∑
j∈I
P ′ij ≤ ai(P ).
Since E ′i > ai(P ), it follows from Definition 2.4 that
Pi = bi(ai(P )) = bi(E
′
i).
We conclude that Pi = P
′
i , a contradiction to the assumption that P
′
i > Pi. 2
A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every pair of elements has a supremum
and an infimum. A complete lattice is a lattice in which every non-empty subset has a
supremum and an infimum. Any finite lattice can be shown to be complete. The infimum
of a two point set {x, x′} is denoted by x ∧ x′ and its supremum by x ∨ x′.
The matrices in P are partially ordered by ≤, since ≤ is a reflexive, transitive, and
antisymmetric order on P .
Consider two matrices P, P ′ ∈ P . We define the matrices P , P ∈ P by
P i = Pi ∧ P ′i , i ∈ I,
P i = Pi ∨ P ′i , i ∈ I.
Since Fi is totally ordered by ≤, it holds that P i is either equal to Pi or to P ′i . Similarly,
it holds that P i is either equal to Pi or to P
′
i . It is now immediate that P , P ∈ P and that
P ∧ P ′ = P and P ∨ P ′ = P . Every pair of matrices in P therefore has a supremum and
an infimum in P . We conclude that the set P is a complete lattice.
Proposition 4.2. Consider a financial network (z, L, b). The set of clearing payment ma-
trices is a complete lattice. In particular, there exists a least clearing payment matrix P−
and a greatest clearing payment matrix P+.
Proof. We show that ϕ is monotone. Let P, P ′ ∈ P be such that P ≤ P ′. For every
i ∈ I, it holds that
ϕi(P ) = bi(ai(P )) = bi(zi +
∑
j∈I
Pji) ≤ bi(zi +
∑
j∈I
P ′ji) = bi(ai(P
′)) = ϕi(P ′),
14
where the inequality follows from the monotonicity of bi.
By Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Tarski, 1955), the set of fixed points of ϕ is a complete
lattice with respect to ≤ . It follows that the set of fixed points has a least and a greatest
element. By Proposition 4.1, the set of fixed points of ϕ is equal to the set of clearing
payment matrices. 2
Example 3.6 shows that two clearing payment matrices may lead to different values of
equity. To analyze the size of the possible differences, we introduce the following notation.
For every i ∈ I, for every Pi ∈ Fi \ {Li}, we define Si(Pi) as the unique successor of Pi, i.e.
the lowest feasible payment vector that is strictly greater than Pi. Note that Si(Pi) is not
defined if Pi = Li.
For every i ∈ I, the number κi equals the maximal difference between total payments
in two consecutive feasible payment vectors for agent i. If Fi consists of a single element,
so Fi = {Li} = {0I}, then we define κi = 1. Otherwise, Fi has at least two elements and
we define
κi = max
Pi∈Fi\{Li}
∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij).
The bankruptcy rules discussed in Example 2.8 give three typical numbers for κi. If bi is
a priority bankruptcy rule, then κi = 1. If bi corresponds to the all or nothing bankruptcy
rule and Li > 0, then κi =
∑
j∈I Lij equals the sum of the liabilities of agent i. It is easy
to see that if bi is the proportional bankruptcy rule and Li > 0, then κi is at most as large
as the number of non-zero liabilities of agent i, which in turn is less than the number of
agents. The latter inequality holds for any induced bankruptcy rule.
Proposition 4.3. Consider a financial network (z, L, b) such that for some i ∈ I it holds
that Li > 0 and the bankruptcy rule bi is induced by the division rule di. Let λi = #{j ∈
I | Lij > 0} be the number of non-zero liabilities of agent i. It holds that κi ≤ λi ≤ n− 1.
Proof. Take any Pi ∈ Fi \ {Li}. Suppose there is j ∈ I such that Sij(Pi) − Pij ≥ 2.
Let E,E ′′ ∈ R+ be such that Pij = bdij(E)c and Sij(Pi) = bdij(E ′′)c. By continuity and
monotonicity of di, there is E
′ ∈ R+ such that E < E ′ < E ′′ and
Pij = bdij(E)c < bdij(E ′)c < bdij(E ′′)c = Sij(Pi).
By monotonicity of di, we have that Pi < bdi(E ′)c < Si(Pi). Since bdi(E ′)c ∈ Fi, this
contradicts the definition of Si(Pi).
Consequently, it holds for every j ∈ I that Sij(Pi)− Pij ∈ {0, 1}, so∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) =
∑
{j∈I|Lij>0}
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) ≤ #{j ∈ I | Lij > 0} = λi ≤ n− 1,
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and therefore
κi = max
Pi∈Fi\{Li}
∑
j∈I
(Sij(Pi)− Pij) ≤ λi ≤ n− 1.
2
The numbers κi for i ∈ I can be used to provide lower and upper bounds on the
maximum difference in equity that results from two different clearing payment matrices.
Proposition 4.4. Consider a financial network (z, L, b) and two clearing payment matrices
P and P ′ with P ≤ P ′. For every i ∈ I, the difference between the value of equity at P and
P ′ satisfies −(κi − 1) ≤ ei(P ′)− ei(P ) ≤
∑
j∈I\{i}(κj − 1).
Proof. We argue first that, for every i ∈ I,
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij} = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij − εi(P ) = ei(P )− εi(P ), (3)
where
εi(P ) ∈
{0}, if ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij,
{0, . . . , κi − 1}, if ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
We distinguish two cases: (a) ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij and (b) ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
Case (a). ai(P ) ≥
∑
j∈I Lij.
It holds that
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij} = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij = ei(P ),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 3.5. It follows that εi(P ) = 0.
Case (b). ai(P ) <
∑
j∈I Lij.
It holds that
εi(P ) = ei(P )−max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij} = ei(P ). (4)
Since P is a clearing payment matrix, it follows that εi(P ) ∈ N0. Moreover, we have by
Proposition 4.1 that∑
j∈I
Pij =
∑
j∈I
bij(ai(P )) ≤ min{
∑
j∈I
Lij, ai(P )} = ai(P ) <
∑
j∈N
Lij.
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Since P satisfies priority of creditors, we have that
ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Sij(Pi) < 0.
Finally, using Equation (4), it follows that
εi(P ) = ei(P ) = ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Pij ≤ ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Sij(Pi) + κi ≤ κi − 1.
This completes the proof that Equation (3) holds.
Let some i ∈ I be given. Since P ≤ P ′, we have that
max{0, ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
Lij} ≤ max{0, ai(P ′)−
∑
j∈I
Lij},
so it follows from Equation (3) that
ei(P )− εi(P ) ≤ ei(P ′)− εi(P ′).
Rewriting this inequality, we obtain
ei(P
′)− ei(P ) ≥ εi(P ′)− εi(P ) ≥ −(κi − 1).
Using Equation (2), we find that
ei(P
′)− ei(P ) =
∑
j∈I\{i}
(ej(P )− ej(P ′)) ≤
∑
j∈I\{i}
(κj − 1),
which completes the proof. 2
By Proposition 4.2, it holds for any clearing payment matrix P that P− ≤ P ≤ P+.
Natural choices in Proposition 5.1 are therefore P = P− and P ′ = P+.
In Example 3.6 it holds that κ1 = κ2 = 2 and κ3 = 1. There are only two possible
clearing payment matrices, P and P . It holds that e1(P ) − e1(P ) = e2(P ) − e2(P ) =
−1 = −(κ1 − 1) = −(κ2 − 1), so the lower bound of Proposition 4.4 is tight. Since
e3(P ) − e3(P ) = 2 = (κ1 − 1) + (κ2 − 1), the upper bound of Proposition 4.4 is tight as
well.
In a financial network with priority bankruptcy rules, or more generally, in a financial
network where κi = 1 for every i ∈ I, Proposition 4.4 implies that the difference between
the value of equity for a given agent at the least clearing payment matrix P− and any
clearing payment matrix P is zero. The value of equity is uniquely determined in this case.
In a financial network with proportional bankruptcy rules, or more generally, in a
financial network where all bankruptcy rules are induced by division rules, the difference
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between the value of equity of agent i at the greatest clearing payment matrix P+ and
any clearing payment matrix P is bounded between −λi ≥ −(n − 1) and
∑
j∈I\{i}(λj −
1) ≤ (n − 1)(n − 1 − 1) = (n − 1)(n − 2) by Proposition 5.1. If all bankruptcy rules
are all or nothing, then this difference is bounded between −(κi − 1) ≥ −
∑
j∈I Lij and∑
j∈I\{i}(κj − 1) ≤
∑
j∈I\{i}
∑
k∈I Ljk.
5 Decentralized Clearing
The literature on default in financial networks has so far always considered centralized
clearing procedures. In this section, we show how any decentralized clearing process in a
large class converges to the least clearing payment matrix. Bounds on equity differences
with the greatest clearing payment matrix are given by Proposition 4.4.
In a centralized clearing procedure, implicitly all agents are filing for bankruptcy si-
multaneously and a clearing payment matrix is centrally computed. One possibility to do
so is by formulating an integer programming problem where the objective is to maximize
the total payments that are made subject to feasibility constraints, see also Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) for a similar formulation in the divisible case with proportional division rules.
maxP∈P
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J Pij,
subject to
∑
j∈I(Pij − Pji) ≤ zi, i ∈ I. (5)
Proposition 5.1. Consider a financial network (z, L, b). The payment matrix P+ is the
unique solution to the maximization problem in (5).
Proof. Assume the payment matrix P ′ is a solution to the maximization problem in
(5). We show next that P ′ satisfies the conditions of Definition 3.4, so P ′ is a clearing
payment matrix.
1. Feasibility. Since P ′ ∈ P , feasibility is satisfied, that is payments are made in
accordance with bankruptcy rules.
2. Limited liability. For every i ∈ I, since ∑j∈I(P ′ij − P ′ji) ≤ zi, we have
ei(P
′) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(P ′ji − P ′ij) ≥ 0,
so P ′ satisfies limited liability.
3. Priority of creditors. Suppose there is i′ ∈ I and P ∗i′ ∈ Fi′ such that P ∗i′ > P ′i′ and
ai′(P
′)−
∑
j∈I
P ∗i′j ≥ 0. (6)
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Complete the definition of the matrix P ∗ by setting P ∗i = P
′
i for i ∈ I \ {i′}. We have that∑
j∈I
(P ∗i′j − P ∗ji′) =
∑
j∈I
(P ∗i′j − P ′ji′) ≤ ai′(P ′)−
∑
j∈I
P ′ji′ = zi′ +
∑
j∈I
(P ′ji′ − P ′ji′) = zi′ ,
where the inequality follows from (6). For every i ∈ I \ {i′}, it holds that∑
j∈I
(P ∗ij − P ∗ji) =
∑
j∈I
(P ′ij − P ∗ji) ≤
∑
j∈I
(P ′ij − P ′ji) ≤ zi,
where the last inequality follows since P ′ is a solution to the maximization problem in (5).
We have shown that P ∗ satisfies all feasibility constraints of the maximization problem
in (5). Since P ∗ > P ′, we obtain a contradiction to P ′ being an optimal solution.
Consequently, for every i ∈ I, for every P ∗i ∈ Fi such that P ∗i > P ′i , it holds that
ai(P
′)−∑j∈I P ∗ij < 0 and P ′ satisfies priority of creditors.
A solution to the maximization problem in (5) is therefore a clearing payment ma-
trix. We show next that the greatest clearing payment matrix P+, guaranteed to exist by
Proposition 4.2, satisfies the feasibility constraints of the maximization problem (5).
It holds that P+ ∈ P . Since P+ satisfies limited liability, for every i ∈ I it holds that
ei(P
+) = zi +
∑
j∈I
(P+ji − P+ij ) ≥ 0.
The proposition now follows from the observation that P+ is the greatest clearing pay-
ment matrix and that the objective function in (5) is strictly monotonic in all entries of P. 2
The only feature of the objective function in maximization problem (5) that is used in
the proof of Proposition 5.1 is its strict monotonicity in each entry of P. If we replace the
objective function
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I Pij in (5) by any objective function o : P → R that is strictly
monotonic on P , we get P+ as the unique solution. So even if the objective function is
such that some agents are favored to others, i.e. carry a higher weight in the objective
function, or if smaller payments are relatively more important than bigger payments, i.e.
the marginal benefits from additional payment are decreasing and the objective function
is concave, it would still be the case that P+ emerges as the unique solution.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) formulate the fictitious default algorithm to find a clearing
payment matrix for the divisible case with proportional division rules. It starts by assuming
that all agents pay their liabilities in full and then checks whether defaults occur. If no first-
order default arises, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, it is assumed that the
agents involved in first-order defaults end up with zero equity, whereas the other agents pay
their liabilities in full, a problem that corresponds to solving a system of linear equations.
If no second-order defaults occur, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise it proceeds
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by setting the equity of first-order and second-order defaulting agents to zero, and so on. It
is shown that this algorithm terminates in at most n steps to the greatest clearing payment
matrix. Variations on this algorithm have been presented in Rogers and Veraart (2013)
and Elliott et al. (2014).
The centralized approaches towards clearing have their limitations. In reality, agents
do not file for bankruptcy simultaneously and even for agents that are declared bankrupt,
the settlement of payments does not occur at the same time. Indeed, not all assets of
a bankrupt agent are equally liquid and the liquidation process may take considerable
time. Moreover, examples like the Lehman bankruptcy or the European sovereign debt
problems involve many different (international) institutions. As emphasized by Elsinger
et al. (2006) and Gai and Kapadia (2010), the complexity of the financial system means
that policymakers have only partial information about the true linkages between financial
intermediaries. The information that is required for a centralized approach is simply not
available.
In this section, we present a general class of decentralized clearing processes with the
following features. At each point in time, an agent is selected by means of a process that is
potentially history-dependent and stochastic. This agent would typically be an agent that
has filed for bankruptcy. Next, the selected agent makes any amount of feasible payments
to the other agents. The amount that is paid depends only on local information and is
determined by a process that again is potentially history-dependent and stochastic. The
only requirement that we make is that the selected agent be eligible, that is can make a
positive incremental payment without ending up with negative equity.
Definition 5.2. Let (z, L, b) be a financial network. The set of eligible agents at P ∈ P is
equal to
G(P ) = {i ∈ I|∃P ′i ∈ Fi such that P ′i > Pi and ai(P )−
∑
j∈I
P ′ij ≥ 0}.
It is easily verified that a payment matrix P ∈ P violates priority of creditors if and
only if G(P ) 6= ∅.
The requirement of making a payment that does not violate limited liability addresses
another problematic aspect of the centralized approach, which is that the payment matrices
as derived in for instance the intermediate steps of the fictitious default algorithm lead to
negative equity values and are therefore not implementable.
Next, we define the general class of decentralized clearing processes described before.
Definition 5.3. Let some financial network (z, L, b) be given. A decentralized clearing
process operates as follows.
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Step 1 We define k = 1 and P 1 = 0I×I . If G(P 1) = ∅, then stop. Otherwise, continue to
Step 2.
Step 2 Select any agent ik+1 ∈ G(P k) and any payment vector P k+1ik+1 ∈ Fik+1 such that
P k+1ik+1 > P
k
ik+1
and aik+1(P
k) −∑j∈I P k+1ik+1j ≥ 0. The matrix P k+1 is completed by
defining P k+1j = P
k
j for j ∈ I \ {ik+1}.
Step 3 If G(P k+1) = ∅, then stop. Otherwise, increase the value of k by 1 and return to
Step 2.
We start from P 1 = 0I×I . This payment matrix satisfies feasibility and limited liability,
and violates priority of creditors if and only if G(P 1) 6= ∅. In Step 2 of the process,
the selected eligible agent ik+1 ∈ G(P k) is required to make a positive (not necessarily
maximal) additional payment P k+1ik+1 −P kik+1 . We think of the rows of the payment matrices
as generated by the decentralized clearing process as the total payments that have been
made so far. The payment matrix P k+1 clearly satisfies feasibility. It satisfies limited
liability by construction for the selected agent. Since the payments for the other agents
only increase, it can be shown by induction that for them limited liability is satisfied as
well. The payment matrix P k+1 violates priority of creditors if and only if G(P k+1) 6= ∅.
There are many alternative ways in which agents can be selected in Step 2 of the
decentralized clearing process. Typically, the selection would be determined by the timing
of agents filing for bankruptcy and the timing of the liquidation of their assets. The
payment vector in Step 2 can be the greatest payment vector that satisfies limited liability,
but it is also possible that the assets of a defaulting agent are not all simultaneously
liquidated and therefore sequential payments to the agent’s creditors are made. In this
way, a decentralized clearing process allows for selling the liquid assets first and the illiquid
ones later.
We illustrate the decentralized clearing process by means of the following example.
Example 5.4. As in Examples 3.3 and 3.6, we consider the financial network (z, L, b) with
three agents I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 6.
z L
1 0 2 2
1 2 0 2
1 0 0 0
Table 6: The endowments and liabilities of the agents in Example 5.4.
We first consider the case where b only involves proportional bankruptcy rules. The
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sets of feasible payments are given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 2, 2)},
F2 = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2)},
F3 = {(0, 0, 0)}.
We start from P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1 it holds that G(P 1) = ∅, so no agent is eligible
to be selected. Indeed, agents 1 and 2 both have an asset value of 1 unit, but since∑
j∈I(S1j(P
1
1 )−P 11j) =
∑
j∈I(S2j(P
1
2 )−P 12j) = 2, their next higher payment vector requires
an asset value of 2 units. We stop at the least clearing payment matrix P− as derived in
Example 3.6.
Now let b only involve priority bankruptcy rules, where agent 1 has priority over agent 2
and agent 2 has priority over agent 3. The sets of feasible payments are given by
F1 = {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1), (0, 2, 2)},
F2 = {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 0, 2)},
F3 = {(0, 0, 0)}.
Let us start the process again with P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1, both agents 1 and 2 are eligible to
be selected, G(P 1) = {1, 2}. Suppose agent 1 files for bankruptcy first. Since a1(P 1) = 1,
the only possible payment vector is (0, 1, 0), where agent 1 pays 1 unit to agent 2 and the
payment matrix is updated to P 2 as presented in Table 7.
P 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 2
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 3
0 1 0
2 0 0
0 0 0
P 4
0 2 1
2 0 0
0 0 0
P 5
0 2 1
2 0 1
0 0 0
Table 7: The total payments in iterations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Example 5.4.
Under P 2 only agent 2 is eligible, G(P 2) = {2}. Since a2(P 2) = 2, there are now two
possible payment vectors for agent 2, (1, 0, 0) and (2, 0, 0). Suppose the liquidator always
selects the maximal payment compatible with limited liability, b2(a2(P
2)) = (2, 0, 0). Agent
2 pays 2 units to agent 1 and 0 units to agent 3. The payment matrix is now P 3 as presented
in Table 7.
Under P 3 only agent 1 is eligible, G(P 3) = {1}. Since a1(P 3) = 3, there are two
possible payment vectors for agent 1, (0, 2, 0) and (0, 2, 1). Under the maximal payment of
b1(a1(P
3)) = (0, 2, 1), agent 1 makes an additional transfer of 1 unit to agent 2 and makes
a transfer of 1 unit to agent 3, and the new payment matrix is equal to P 4. At P 4, it holds
that G(P 4) = {2}, the only possible payment vector is (2, 0, 1), so agent 2 makes a transfer
of 1 unit to agent 3. Since G(P 5) = ∅, there are no more eligible agents and the process is
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over at the payment matrix P 5 of Table 7. In this example, the matrix P 5 is the unique
clearing payment matrix.
Proposition 5.5. Given a financial network (z, L, b), a decentralized clearing process ter-
minates in a finite number of iterations with the least clearing payment matrix P−.
Proof. Finite convergence is satisfied, since total payments made increase by at least
one unit in each iteration and total payments have to be bounded above by the amounts
involved in the liabilities, a finite number.
Assume that (P 1, . . . , PK) corresponds to the realization of a decentralized process. We
show that PK is a clearing payment matrix by verifying the conditions of Definition 3.4.
1. Feasibility. In each iteration a feasible payment vector is selected, thus PK ∈ P .
2. Limited liability. It is immediate to verify that P 1 = 0I×I satisfies limited liability.
We proceed by induction. Assume, for some k < K, P k satisfies limited liability. For the
selected agent ik+1 it holds that∑
j∈I
P k+1ik+1j ≤ aik+1(P k) = aik+1(P k+1).
For every agent i ∈ I \ {ik+1}, we have∑
j∈I
P k+1ij =
∑
j∈I
P kij ≤ ai(P k) ≤ ai(P k+1),
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis.
We conclude that P k satisfies limited liability for every k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
3. Priority of creditors. Suppose PK does not satisfy priority of creditors. It follows
that G(PK) 6= ∅, which contradicts that the decentralized clearing process terminates at
PK .
We have shown that PK is clearing payment matrix. To show that it is the least clearing
payment matrix, let k be the last iteration in {1, . . . , K} such that P k ≤ P−. Notice that
such a k exists since P 1 ≤ P−.
Suppose k < K.We argue first that P k+1 ≤ ϕ(P k). By construction of P k+1ik+1 it holds that∑
j∈I P
k+1
ik+1j
≤ aik+1(P k), so clearly P k+1ik+1 ≤ bik+1(aik+1(P k)) = ϕik+1(P k). For i ∈ I \ {ik+1},
it holds that
P k+1i = P
k
i ≤ bi(ai(P k)) = ϕi(P k),
where the inequality follows from the fact that P k satisfies limited liability.
Then we have that
P k+1 ≤ ϕ(P k) ≤ ϕ(P−) = P−,
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where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of ϕ as shown in the proof of
Proposition 4.2 and the equality from the fact that P− is a fixed point of ϕ by Proposi-
tion 4.1. This contradicts the definition of k as the last iteration such that P k ≤ P−.
Consequently, we have that k = K. Since PK ≤ P− and PK is a clearing payment
matrix, it follows that PK = P−. 2
Whereas the centralized procedures yield the greatest payment matrix P+, a decentral-
ized process converges to the least payment matrix P−. Surprisingly, the convergence to
P− is independent of the precise specification of the decentralized process in the following
sense. The process to select eligible agents is potentially history-dependent and stochastic.
The additional payments are only required to be positive and not necessarily maximal,
taking into account limited liability. They may be determined in a potentially history-
dependent and stochastic way too. What is important is that selected agents pay some
extra amount in accordance with the bankruptcy rules. If payments are not in accordance
with the bankruptcy rules, then one might end up with a different clearing payment matrix.
For instance, in case agents could decide themselves whom to pay, they have incentives to
pay those agents on which they have claims. Obviously, without enforcement of payments,
agents would prefer not to pay at all.
Whether the difference between a centralized procedure and a decentralized process is
substantial or not depends on the values of κi, see Proposition 4.4.
6 The Divisible Case
In this section we analyze the divisible setup and relate it to our discrete setup.
A financial network (z, L, d) in the divisible case consists of endowments z ∈ RI+, a
liability matrix L ∈ RI×I+ , and division rules d = (di)i∈I with di : R+ → RI+. As before, we
use P for the set of feasible payment matrices, so
P = {P ∈ RI×I+ | ∀i ∈ I, Pi ∈ di(R+)}.
A clearing payment matrix is now defined as follows.
Definition 6.1. Given a financial network (z, L, d) in the divisible case, P ∈ RI×I+ is a
clearing payment matrix if it satisfies the following three properties.
1. Feasibility : P ∈ P .
2. Limited liability : For every i ∈ I, ei(P ) ≥ 0.
3. Priority of creditors : For every i ∈ I, if Pi < Li, then ei(P ) = 0.
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It follows from the results in Groote Schaarsberg et al. (2013) that a clearing payment
matrix exists in the divisible case and that each clearing payment matrix leads to the same
value of equity, thereby generalizing the same result for the case with proportional division
rules by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We denote this value of equity by e∗ ∈ RI+.
The assumption of perfectly divisible payments is clearly an abstraction. We are inter-
ested in the question whether it serves as a good approximation for the case with a smallest
unit of account, when this smallest unit converges to zero.
For m ∈ N, let 1/m be the unit of account. To each financial network (z, L, d) in the
divisible case, we associate a financial network (z(m), L(m), bd(m)), where z(m) = bm · zc,
L(m) = bm · Lc, and bd(m) = bbm·d(R+)c. Amounts now correspond to multiples of 1/m, so
we have to divide z(m), L(m), and bd(m) by m to compare them to z, L, and d, respectively.
Asset and equity values resulting from a payment matrix P ∈ M in the model with
unit of account 1/m are denoted by am(P ) and em(P ), respectively. We have
ami (P ) = zi(m) +
∑
j∈I Pji, i ∈ I,
emi (P ) = a
m
i (P )−
∑
j∈I Pij, i ∈ I.
The following proposition gives an affirmative answer to our question.
Proposition 6.2. Let (z, L, d) be a financial network in the divisible case. For every
m ∈ N, let Pm be a clearing payment matrix of the financial network (z(m), L(m), bd(m)).
Then limm→∞(1/m) · em(Pm) = e∗.
Proof. Since ((1/m) · Pm)m∈N is a bounded sequence, we can assume without loss of
generality that it converges to a matrix P .
We show that P is a clearing payment matrix for the financial network (z, L, d) in the
divisible case by verifying the three conditions of Definition 6.1.
1. Feasibility. Take some i ∈ I. It holds that Pmi ∈ bm · di(R+)c, so (1/m) · Pmi =
(1/m) · bm · di(Emi )c for some Emi ∈ R+. It follows that (1/m) · bm · di(Emi )c = bdi(Emi )cm,
where bxcm denotes the greatest multiple of 1/m that is less than or equal to x ∈ R+. The
Hausdorff distance of the point bdi(Emi )cm to the compact set di(R+) is less than or equal
to 1/m under ‖ · ‖∞. It then follows that
P i = lim
m→∞
1
m
· Pmi = lim
m→∞
bdi(Emi )cm ∈ di(R+).
2. Limited liability. Take some i ∈ I. By limited liability in Definition 3.4, emi (Pm) ≥ 0,
so (1/m) · emi (Pm) ≥ 0, and
ei(P i) = lim
m→∞
(1/m) · emi (Pm) ≥ 0.
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3. Priority of creditors. Assume i ∈ I is such that P i < Li. For m sufficiently large, it
holds that Pmi < bm · Lic. By priority of creditors in Definition 3.4 it follows that
ami (P
m) <
∑
j∈I
Smij (P
m
i ) ≤
∑
j∈I
Pmij + n− 1,
where Smi (P
m
i ) denotes the unique successor of P
m
i . We find that
emi (P
m) = ami (P
m)−
∑
j∈I
Pmij < n− 1,
so
ei(P i) = lim
m→∞
(1/m)emi (P
m) ≤ 0.
Since ei(P i) satisfies limited liability, it follows that ei(P i) = 0.
We conclude that the matrix P is a clearing payment matrix in the sense of Defini-
tion 6.1, so e(P ) = e∗, and therefore
lim
m→∞
1
m
· em(Pm) = e(P ) = e∗.
2
A decentralized clearing process in the spirit of Definition 5.3 can also be defined in the
divisible setup. We show by means of an example that in the divisible setup, convergence
of a decentralized clearing process might require infinitely many iterations even if in every
Step 2 of the process the highest payment vector consistent with limited liability is selected.
Example 6.3. As in Example 3.6, we consider a financial network (z, L, d) with three
agents I = {1, 2, 3} and endowments and liabilities as presented in Table 8, but now
do not assume a smallest unit of account, so have proportional division rules instead of
proportional bankruptcy rules. The unique clearing payment matrix and the resulting
asset and equity values are presented in Table 8 as well.
z L P a(P ) e(P )
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Table 8: The financial network and the unique clearing payment matrix in Example 6.3,
when using the proportional division rule.
We study a decentralized clearing process and start with the situation with agents
making no transfers, P 1 = 0I×I . Under P 1, both agents 1 and 2 are eligible to be selected,
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since both of them have positive assets and positive liabilities. Assume the liquidator
starts with agent 1 and requires him to make the maximal payment vector satisfying
limited liability, d1(a1(P
1)) = (0, 1/2, 1/2). At P 2 only agent 2 is eligible and the maximal
payment vector satisfying limited liability is d2(a2(P
2)) = (3/4, 0, 3/4). Proceeding in this
way, we obtain the sequence of payment matrices as presented in Table 9. Agents 1 and 2
are selected in an alternating fashion with their maximal payment vector consistent with
limited liability. The process takes infinitely many iterations, so does never stop.
P 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 2
0 1/2 1/2
0 0 0
0 0 0
P 3
0 1/2 1/2
3/4 0 3/4
0 0 0
P 4
0 7/8 7/8
3/4 0 3/4
0 0 0
P 5
0 7/8 7/8
15/16 0 15/16
0 0 0
. . .
Table 9: The total payments in iterations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Example 6.3.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by a large literature on contagion in financial networks, we study bankruptcy
problems in a network environment, thereby generalizing the large literature on bankruptcy
problems that consider the division of a single estate among multiple claimants. An im-
portant difference with the case of a single estate is that in a network environment, the
value of the estate is endogenous as it depends on the extent to which other agents pay
their liabilities.
Unlike the large literature on systemic risk, which invariably has focused on proportional
rules, we allow for general bankruptcy rules. Moreover, we do not study the perfectly
divisible case, but instead assume that there is a smallest unit of account. Apart from
the already mentioned financial applications, other examples where our model applies are
for instance international student exchange networks and job processing by a network of
servers.
We define the notion of a clearing payment matrix for our discrete setup as a payment
matrix that satisfies feasibility, limited liability, and priority of creditors. We show that
such payment matrices exist and that they constitute a complete lattice, so in particular
there is a least and a greatest clearing payment matrix. Contrary to the divisible case, it is
not the case that all payment matrices induce the same value of equity. It therefore matters
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which payment matrix is being used. We do produce bounds on the maximal differences
in equity values that can result from using different clearing payment matrices.
The systemic risk literature on financial networks has considered a number of centralized
procedures to find a clearing payment matrix and the emphasis has been on finding the
greatest clearing payment matrix. The centralized procedures assume a great amount
of coordination and information that is typically not available. In this paper we study
decentralized processes to select agents and force them to liquidate their assets. We require
that each iteration in such a process satisfies limited liability. The required payments can
therefore be implemented at every step. We find that for a large class of decentralized
processes, there is convergence to the least clearing payment matrix in a finite number
of iterations. We argue that when the unit of account is sufficiently small, which would
be the case in most financial applications, the final values of equity as determined by
any decentralized process are essentially the same as the ones determined by a centralized
procedure.
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